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With the decision in Simson v. Langholf,' Colorado joins those
oil producing states whose appellate courts have been required to
engage in the game of semantics and conjecture known as "the construction of transfers and reservations of royalty and mineral fee
interests."'
Recognition in Colorado of an interest in minerals in place as an
estate in land separate and apart from the surface ownership commenced with Union Pacific R. R. Co. v. Hanna,' and the doctrine has
become well entrenched through a series of decisions. 4 In Frank v.
Bauer5 and Pike v. Empfield,6 without attempting definition or discussion, the Colorado Court of Appeals impliedly recognized the
creation and existence of royalty interests in ore mined and produced. Pierce v. Marland Oil Co., dealth with overriding royalties on
Indian leases, the court pronouncing the "rents and royalties are
profits issuing out of the land."" It was not until the Simson case,
however, that an appellate court in Colorado was faced with the
necessity of construing a conveyance pertaining to an interest in
minerals, necessitating a judicial differentiation between royalty
and mineral in place.
The Simson case involved an action to quiet title in fee simple to
49 % of all the oil and gas underlying certain property in Jackson
133 Colo. 208, 293 P.2d 302 (1956). For discussions of this case see Note, 28 Rocky Mt. L. Rev.
441 (1956); Discussion Note, 6 Oil and Gas Rep. 1011 (1956).
2 The Colorado Supreme Court thus joins its judicial brethren in the states of Alabama, Arkansas,
California, Florida, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Montana, New Mexico, North
Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Texas, West Virginia and Wyoming.
873 Colo. 162, 214 Pac. 550 (1923).
4 Farrell v. Sayre, 129 Colo. 368, 270 P.2d 190 (1954), commented on in Note, 31 DICTA 278
(1954); Brown v. Kirk, 127 Colo. 453, 257 P.2d 145 (1953); Mitchell v. Espinosa, 125 Colo. 267, 243
P.2d 412 (1952); Calvat v. Juhan, 119 Colo. 561, 206 P.2d 600 (1949).
19 Colo. App. 445, 75 Pac. 930 (1903).
621 Colo. App. 161, 120 Pac. 1054 (1912).
,86 Colo. 59, 278 Pac. 804 (1929).
8 86 Colo. 63, 278 Pac. 807.
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County, Colorado, the interest in question having been created
under the terms of an "agreement" (although in reality a conveyance) which, after reciting a consideration in favor of the grantor
of 1% of all oil and/or gas produced, saved and marketed under a
United States oil and gas prospecting permit, "assigned and set
over" to the grantee, 49% of all oil and/or gas that may be produced, saved and marketed" from certain described lands. The
instrument was acknowledged before (and, it is interesting to note,
was also prepared by) the county clerk and recorder. The trial
court found the instrument to be ambiguous, permitting the introduction of extrinsic evidence to show the intent and meaning of the
parties, and held the defendants were the owners of the property
involved in fee simple, subject to the right of the plaintiff, his heirs
and assigns, to 49% of any royalty payment the defendants might
receive by virtue of any oil and gas lease executed on the property.
The trial court further ruled that the plaintiff, the owner of the
conveyed interest, had no right, title or interest in the fee of the
property, and no control in the leasing thereof or in any bonus
or delay rental payments. The supreme court reversed the judgment, holding that the plaintiff was the owner in fee simple of 49%
of the oil and gas in place, saying:
"where the conveyance or reservation, as the case may be,
consists of an interest in perpetuity to all the oil and gas
minerals that may be extracted, the conveyance or reservation is a grant or reservation of the minerals in fee simple
with the attributes and rights that go with such ownership,
including the right to enter upon the land for exploration
of oil, 'participating in delay rents, bonuses and leasing."9
The court recognized that "although confusion often exists in
the minds of laymen and inexperienced conveyancers in the words
to be used in creating a royalty interest or a mineral interest, the
two estates are in fact separate and distinct and have well defined
legal attributes."1 o Unfortunately, however, if several of the statements in the decision are to be taken at face value, it would appear
that the court has chosen to follow an originally ill-considered,
generally rejected doctrine, which is recognized only in the State
of West Virginia (and even there is open to question) to the effect
9 133 Colo. at 215, 293 P.2d at 307.
w Ibid., 293 P.2d at 306, citing Palmer v. Crews, 203 Miss. 806, 35 So. 2d 430 (1948),
Annot., 4 A.L.R.2d (1948).
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that a perpetual nonparticipating royalty interest in oil, gas and
other minerals cannot be created. For example, consider the statement that:
"the ordinary meaning of the word 'royalty' as applied to an
existing oil and gas lease is the compensation provided in
the lease for the privilege of drilling for and producing oil
and gas and consists of a share of the oil and gas produced
or the profits therefrom, but it does not include a perpetual
interest in the realty."'"
And again, the pronouncement that:
"there being no oil or gas lease in existence at the time of
the conveyance or reservation, the words of the grant or
reservation 'assigned and set over' are such as to convey a
partial interest in the minerals in perpetuity, and an estate
in fee simple is thus created.'

12

In arriving at these conclusions, the court cited numerous decisions from other jurisdictions.3 Careful scrutiny of these cases,
however, indicates that most of them are not authority for the
proposition advanced by the Colorado court, and a few are directly
contra.
As a further bulwark to its conclusions, the court relied upon
the time-honored, but often misconstrued and misapplied dictum of
Coke that "if a man seized of land in fee by his deed granteth to
another the profits of those lands, to have and to hold to him and
his heirs, and maketh livery secundum formam chartae, the whole4
land itself doth pass. For what is the land but the profits thereof?"'
With deference to Lord Coke, it is suggested that a statement of
feudal rights in real property is hardly a realistic basis for the construction of grants of oil and gas. Furthermore, the court overlooked the fact that the royalty right is only one of the profits
which may be derived by the landowner from the oil and gas
underlying his property. Bonus payments for leasing to oil and gas
operators and delay rentals arising under such leases for the privilege of deferring drilling operations are likewise profits arising out
of the ownership of oil and gas, as is the right of the landowner to
develop and produce the minerals himself, thereby entitling him
to all of the proceeds received from any purchaser. Certainly, Coke
does not suggest that the conveyance of the right to cut timber, for
example, being one of the possible profits derived from land, constitutes a grant of the entire fee simple estate.
It is of course recognized that in cases of first impression an
appellate court must of necessity be guided to a great extent by
counsel, and it must be pointed out in fairness that the brief of
attorneys for the successful appellant was brilliantly conceived
and written.2 In addition, there is no question but that the court
was faced with something of a dilemma in the construction of the
interest involved. A literal construction of the instrument in quesn 133 Colo. at 215, 293 P.2d at 306 (emphasis supplied).
12Id. at 216, 293 P.2d at 307.
Is Id. at 216-17, 293 P.2d at 307.
14 1 Co. Litt. 45.
Is Brief of plaintiff in error, Simson v. Langholf, 133 Colo. 208, 293 P.2d 302 (1956) (case No.
17674).
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tion was neither feasible nor desirable. It cannot seriously be contended that the interest created was a full 49% perpetual nonparticipating royalty interest, thereby entitling the owner to 49
out of every 100 barrels of oil produced. Such a conclusion would,
for all practical purposes, completely prevent development of the
property for oil and gas purposes. Few, if any, operators would be
willing to incur the expense and risk involved in the drilling of an
oil or gas well knowing that the remuneration, if successful, would.
be limited to 51% of the production obtained. From a practical
standpoint, then, the court was required to select one of two possible alternatives: First, that the interest conveyed was a perpetual non-participating royalty interest amounting to 49% of the
royalty on all oil and gas produced, saved and marketed, this being
the conclusion reached by the trial court; or, second, that the grantee
received an undivided 49 % fee simple interest in the oil and gas
in place, thereby entitling him to the right of entry for exploitation of the minerals, and participation in delay rentals and bonuses
derived under any oil and gas lease, this being the result
erroneously arrived at by the supreme court. A possible third, and
in the opinion of the writer, a less desirable solution would be a
holding that the interest conveyed was an estate in fee simple
in the oil and gas underlying the property, but not entitling the
owner to enter and develop the minerals or participate in delay
rentals and bonuses. The obviously hybrid nature of such an
alternative is readily apparent.
Standing alone, the result reached in the Simson case would
not be irretrievably damaging to the development of the law of
oil and gas in Colorado. The holding could have been justified on
the theory that use of a large fraction such as 49% discloses on
the face of the instrument that the parties were dealing with the
oil and gas in place and not with the royalty interest in these
substances. The danger in the decision is the repeated suggestion
that a perpetual nonparticipating royalty interest cannot be
reserved or conveyed, and that the attempt to do results in the
creation of a fee simple interest in the oil and gas in place. The
implications of such a doctrine are far reaching and possibly
catastrophic. The attorney representing an oil and gas lessee
must, on the basis of this decision, require his client to obtain oil
and gas leases from every owner of what would otherwise appear
to be royalty interests appearing in the chain of title. Attorneys
representing purchasers and sellers of interests in oil and gas must
be aware that if they prepare an instrument purportedly transferring or reserving a perpetual nonparticipating royalty interest,

F
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they may very well be carving up the ownership of the fee simple
title to the oil and gas in place. Oil and gas lessees who are
presently producing properties charged with what have always
been construed as royalty interests may find they are tenants in
common in the mineral estate with the so-called royalty owners
whose interests are unleased. Even more dangerous is the position
of the royalty owner holding, let us say, under a transfer of a 2 %
perpetual nonparticipating royalty. If the Simson decision, and
its dictum, are the law in Colorado, this royalty owner (assuming
the standard %s royalty lease) will be entitled not to 2% of the
gross production from the property in which he holds his interest,
of the total production.
but will receive only 2% of 1/8
There are a number of excellent and definitive treatises concerning the judicial construction of transfers of minearl and royalty
interest.'" It is not the purpose of this article, therefore, to retrace
the paths already trod by much more learned authors, nor to
attempt a correlation of the vast number of cases dealing with the
problem. However, due to the rapidity with which decisions pertaining to royalty and mineral interests are being rendered,' and because of the literally hundreds of decided cases concerned with the
question, a compilation of the decisions on a jurisdictional basis,
and' a survey of what appear to be the prevailing views of the
appellate courts of the various states should be of interest and value.
DEFINITIONS
A nonparticipating royalty interest has a well-understood meaning in the oil industry, and has been frequently defined by numerous courts and authors.' A particularly lucid definition advanced by
one authority is that nonparticiapting royalty is "an interest in the
gross prduction of oil, gas and other minerals carved out of the
the right to participate in the execution of, the bonus payable for, or
mineral fee estate as a free royalty, which does not carry with it
the delay rentals to accrue under, oil, gas and mineral leases
executed by the owner of the mineral fee estate."'" As a necessary

16

See, e.g., Cantwell, Term Royalty, Seventh Annual Institute on Oil and Gas Law and Taxation 339 (Southwestern Legal Foundation 1956); Colby, Law of Oil and Gas, 31 Calif. L. Rev. 357
(1943); Jones, Problems Presented by the Separation of the Exclusive Leasing Power from the
Ownership of Land, Minerals or Royalty, Second Annual Institute on Oil and Gas Law and Taxation
271 (Southwestern Legal Foundation 1951); Jones, Non-Participating Royalty, 26 Texas L. Rev.
(1948) [primarily concerned with the duties owed the non-participating royalty owner by the
holder of the executive or leasing rights and the effect of Schlittler v. Smith, 128 Tex. 628, 101
S.W.2d 542 (1937) and Brown v. Sm:th, 141 Tex. 425, 174 S.W.2d 43 (1943)]; Levy, Oil Royalties,
A Distinct Species of Property, 11 So. Calif. L. Rev. 319 (1938) (containing a critique of many of
the California decisions); Masterson, A Survey of Basic Oil and Gas Low, Fourth Annual Institute on
Oil and Gas Law and Taxation 219 (Southwestern Legal Foundation 1953); Maxwell, The MineralRoyalty Distinction and the Expense of Production, 33 Texas L. Rev. 463 (1955 )(author convincingly
asserts that the basic distinction between a mineral interest and a royalty interest is that the former
is expense-bearing and he latter expense-free); Maxwell, A Primer of Mineral and Royalty Conveyancing, 3 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 449 (1956); Morris, Some Legal Consequences Resulting from a Separation
of the Incidents of Ownership of a Mineral Interest, 7 Okla. L. Rev. 285 (1954); and see Annot. 4
A.L.R.2d 492 (1948); Moulton, Problems and Pitfalls Arising From Mineral and Royalty Conveyances,
Proceedings, Mineral Low Section, A.B.A. 285 (1956) (containing an informative discussion of the
Montana decisions in the field); Nabors, The Louisiana Servitude and Royalty Doctrines: A Report to
the Mineral Law Committee of the Louisiana State Low Institute, 25 Tul. L. Rev. 30, 303, 485 (195051), 26 Tul. L. Rev. 23, 172, 303 (1951-52); Stanton, Recent Developments in the Construction of Mineral and Royalty Grants and Reservations, Seventh Annual Institute on Oil and Gas Law and Taxation
301 (Southwestern Legal Foundation 1956); Sullivan, Assignments by the Landowner and Lessee, 17
Mont. L. Rev. 64 (1955); Summers, Transfers of Oil and Gas Rents and Royalties, 10 Texas L. Rev. 1
(1931); Tippit, Creating Mineral and Royalty Interests, 29 DICTA 186 (1952) (concerned primarily
with practical problems of conveyances); Turpin, Mineral Deeds and Royalty Transfers, First Annual
Institute on Oil and Gas Law and Taxation 221 (Southwestern Legal Foundation 1949).
I- Since early 1952 over 75 cases dealing with the mineral v. royalty. question have been decided.
16E.g., Bellport v. Harrison, 123 Kan. 310, 255 Poc. 52 (1927); Palmer v. Crews, 203 Miss. 806,
35 So.2d 43 (1948); Schlittler v. Smith, 128 Tex. 628, 101 S.W.2d 543 (1937); Moulton, supra note 16.
19Jones, Non-Participating Royalty, supra note 16.
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adjunct to this definition it might be added that the owner of the
nonparticipating royalty interest does not have the right or privilege of entering upon and producing the minerals from the land involved. Nonparticipating royalty interests may be perpetual, 20 or

limited to a prescribed term of years, in which case the creating
21
instrument ordinarily provides for perpetuation by production.
In contra-distinction to the royalty interest is the so-called
"mineral-fee interest" which consists of the ownership in fee simple
of the oil, gas and other minerals together with the rights, attributes
and privileges appurtenant to such ownership, including the right
to enter upon the lands and explore for, produce and develop the
minerals, or the right to grant leases to others for such purposes
and to participate in the bonus payments, delay rentals and royalties
derived from or payable by virtue of such leases. As previously
indicated, the mineral fee estate, which may exist in conjunction
2 In connection with perpetual non-participating royalty interests the problem of the Rule against
Perpetuities has been raised in a few jurisdictions, notably Kansas. See Lathrop v. Eyestone, 170
Kan. 419, 227 P.2d 136 (1951) (holding that a perpetual non-participating royalty interest created
while the lands were leased, but prior to production, was invalid as a violation of the Rule); cf.
Miller v. Sooy, 120 Kan. 81, 242 Pac. 140 (1926). The conclusion reached in the Lathrop case, however,
would seem to be severely limited by later Kansas decisions in Froelich v. United Royalty Ca., 178
Kan. 503, 290 P.2d 93 (1955); Howell v. Co-op. Refinery Ass'n, 176 Kan. 572, 271 P.2d 271 (1954);
Kenoyer v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 173 Kan. 183, 245 P.2d 176 (1952). Arkansas has rejected the
doctrine of the Lathrop case, holding expressly contra in Hanson v. Ware, 224 Ark. 430, 274 S.W.2d
359 (1955). Although generally outside the scope of this article, the reader is referred to Kuntz,
The Rule Against Perpetuities and Mineral Interests, 8 Okla. L. Rev. 183 (1955) and Meyers, The
Effect of the Rule Against Perpetuities on Perpetual Non-Participating Royalty and Kindred Interests,
32 Texas L. Rev. 369 (1954) for alluminating treatments of the subject.
- See Cantwell, supra note 16, for a treatment of determinable royalty interests, pointing up the
problems involved when the interest is susceptible of continuation by production.
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with or severed and apart from the surface ownership is well recognized in Colorado. 22 This view of the mineral ownership, that the
landowner actually "owns" the oil and gas in place in fee simple,
has become known as the doctrine of "absolute ownership" or "title
in place," and the states (including Colorado) following this theory
are generally referred to as the "absolute ownership states.

' 23

Some

jurisdictions, however, including California, Louisiana and apparently Oklahoma, are more or less committed to the so-called "nonownership" or "no title in place" theory, to the effect that the landowner does not have an absolute unqualified title to the oil and gas
in place, holding instead only the exclusive right to drill for and
produce these substances. 24 Whether a state follows the ownership
theory or the non-ownership or qualified ownership theory has thus
far had little bearing on the differentiation between royalty and
mineral interests.25 This follows from the fact that even the so-called
non-ownership states have recognized the difference between an
expense-bearing interest in the minerals as distinguished from the
expense-free royalty interest. Actually, the ownership versus nonownership controversy is often simply a matter of semantics, the
application of either doctrine leading to the same practical result
in many situations.
With this brief introduction to basic terminology we28proceed to
a discussion of decisions in states other than Colorado.
TEXAS
Texas was perhaps the originator, and is certainly the leading
exponent of the absolute ownership theory, having projected this
doctrine to its logical extreme by holding that an oil and gas lease
conveys 2 to
the lessee a determinable fee interest in the oil and gas
7
in place.

The evolution of the law concerning transfers and reservations
of mineral and royalty interests did not have a particularly
auspicious genesis in Texas. Several early decisions held the royalty
interest reserved by a lessor in an oil and gas lease (particularly
where payable in money rather than in kind) to be personalty. 2
Fortunately, this view was partially thwarted in Hager v. Stakes, 29
and completely overruled in Sheffield v. Hogg.30 Confusion was also
created by Caruthers v. Leonard3 1 holding that the conveyance of
2 See cases cited at notes 1, 3 and 4, supra.

2 Kulp, Oil and Gas Rights § 10.5 (1954) and cases cited at note 7 therein. The author points
out that "sometimes the decisions in the same jurisdictions are conflicting, while a state is vacillating as to which theory to follow" and in support of this cites a number of decisions. Id. n. 8.
N Ibid., and cases cited at note 8 therein.
"But see Little v. Mountain View Dairies, 35 Col. 2d 232, 217 P.2d 416 (1950).
w In the discussion that follows, the author has attempted to at least cite most of the cases
from the purticulur jurisdiction in question bearing directly on the subject matter of this article.
Because af the almost overwhelming number of decisions, however, it is impossible to include them
"Texas Co. v. Dougherty, 107 Tex. 226, 176 S.W. 717 (1915); Kulp, op. cit. supra, note 23; Walker, The Nature of the Property Inferest Created By an Oil and Gas Lease, 7 Texas L. Rev. 1, 7 (1928).
5Curlee v. Anderson and Patterson, 235 S.W. 622 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921); Farmers & Merchants
State Bank v. Tullis, 211 S.W. 847 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919); Jones v. O'Brien, 251 S.W. 208 (Tex. Com.
App. 1923), off'd, O'Brien v. Jones, 274 S.W. 242 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925).
29116 Tex. 453, 294 S.W. 835 (1927), see Comment, 13 Texas L. Rev. 501 (1935), and Note, 6
Texas L. Rev. 236 (1928).
W 124 Tex. 290, 77 S.W.2d 1021 (1934).
' 254 S.W. 779 (Tex.
Cam. App. 1923), possibly, although not expressly, adopting dictum in
Walker v. Ames, 229 S.W. 365 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921). See also Queen v. Turmon, 257 S.W. 1092 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1924).
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a fractional mineral interest did not entitle the grantee to share in
delay rentals payable under an existing lease. In a case decided at
approximately the same time, however, it was held that a mineral
conveyance coupled with an express transfer of the same fractional
interest "in all the rights and royalties accruing by reason" of an
existing lease, entitled the grantee to his share of the rentals."
The erroneous pronouncement of Caruthers v. Leonard was probably disposed of in Hager v. Stakes,3 3 and was uneqivocally overruled in Harris v. Currie.3 4 Guess v. Harmonson 15 correctly held
that a conveyance of an undivided 1/2 interest in and to the royalties
to be derived from the production of oil, gas and other minerals did
not permit the grantee to participate in bonus and delay rental
payments, recognizing the fundamental distinction between
royalty and mineral interests.
EARLY DECISIONS

Hogg v. Magnolia Petroleum Co.3

and Porter v. Shaw, 7 both

pioneer cases, illustrate the common misconception still extant that
the landowner's ownership in the oil and gas is limited to a 1/s interest, and also point up the loose manner in which the terms "royalty"
and "mineral" are used interchangeably by laymen, lawyers and
the judiciary. In the Hogg case, the court assumed, without deciding,
that the conveyance of an undivided 1/32 interest in and to all of
T

Collins v. Stilger, 253 S.W. 572 ( ex. Civ. App. 1923).
116 Tex. 453, 294 S.W. 835 (1927).
' 142 Tex. 93, 176 S.W.2d 302 (1943), discussed in Comment, 13 Texas L. Rev. 501 (1935).
'4 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928).
s 267 S.W. 482 (Tex. Com. App. 1924).
12 S.W.2d 595 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929).
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the oil, gas and other minerals "in, on and under said land" transferred (in addition to a 1/32 interest in the minerals in place) a 1/32
part of the gross production. 38 In the Porter case, the court reconciled the grant of a 1/16 interest in the minerals with a statement
contained in the deed that the grantor and grantee were to share
equally in benefits under future leases. In Way v. Venus, 0 it was
held that a reservation of minerals "which may be found in the
future on any of the lands" reserved a present vested interest, the
words "which may be found in the future" being simply expressive
of the uncertainty of the existence of minerals, rather than imposing
a condition upon the reservation. In an unsatisfactory opinion, blest
with a well reasoned dissent, the court in Jones v. Bedford0 construed a grant of "one-eighth of one-eighth royalty interest" as
conveying an undivided 1/64 interest in the oil, gas and other minerals in place, entitling the grantee to only 1/64 of the standard 1ys
royalty. The court simply eliminated the word "royalty" from the
granting clause because of additional provisions in the deed reciting
that the grantees should be entitled to 1/s of 1/s of the money rentals
under any oil and gas lease and should own the same fractional
interest in the oil, gas and other minerals.
Schlittler v. Smith" is a landmark case in Texas for several
reasons. It was one of the first cases in Texas recognizing the creation of a pure royalty interest, holding expressly that the reservation of a 1/2 interest "in and to the royalty rights" in all oil, gas and
other minerals did not constitute a reservation of the mineral fee
estate entitling the holder to participation in bonus or delay rentals.
Just as important, however, the case created a new legal concept in
the court's enunciation that "utmost fair dealing" must be used by
the holder of the exclusive leasing privilege in his relationship with
the royalty owners. Similar implications appear
in succeeding de4
cisions4 2 culminating in Brown v. Smith. 3
Regardless of the well-defined distinctions between the royalty
and mineral fee interest, the presence or absence of the word
"royalty" in a conveyance imports no particular magic. 44 Several
decisions have construed the grant or reservation of a fractional
interest in the oil and gas as creating a royalty interest although
the word "royalty" was not employed in the conveyance. 4 In like
7 A conclusion possibly justified by the action of the parties in executing simultaneous documents referring to a 1/ royalty interest.
m 35 S.W.2d 467 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931).
*o 56 S.W.2d 305 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933) (an example, incidentally, of the misuse of printed forms).
4 128 Tex. 628, 101 S.W.2d 543 (1937), reversing, Smith v. Schlittler, 66 S.W.2d 353 (Tex. Cir.
App. 1933).
4"Winterman v. McDonald, 129 Tex. 275, 286, 102 S.W.2d 167, 173 (1937) (duty of "ordinary
care and diligence"); Moore v. City of Beaumont, 195 S.W.2d 968, 980 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946) (implied
obligation).
43 141 Tex. 425, 174 S.W.2d 43 (1943) (restricting the holder of the exclusive leasing power in his
right to combine in a single lease acreage charged with a royalty interest with lands not so encumbered).
44 See, e.g., Jones v. Bedford, 56 S.W.2d 305 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933).
45 Klein v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 126 Tex. 450, 86 S.W.2d 1077 (1935) (reservation of 1/
"mineral rights," with provision that grantors not entitled to lease or participate in bonus or rental
held to be 1/8 royalty-Query whether the interest should not be t/8 of the royalty); Pinchback v. Gulf
Oil Corp. 242 S.W.2d 242 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952) (holding that a reservation of 1/e of all minerals "that
may hereafter be produced and saved" constituted a perpetual non-participating royalty interest, but
erroneously opining that the grantee received "7/8 of the oil beneath the surface" subject to the royalty charge); Miller v. Speed, 248 S.W.2d 250 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952), a case distinguished for its
erudite discussion of the mineral-royalty distinction, and construing "1/24 of all oil, gas and other
minerals produced, saved and made available for market," as a royalty interest. The court probably
over-emphasizes the importance of the words "produced, saved and made available for market" for
even these words, when coupled with the executive right to lease and participate in bonus and
rentals, might compel construction as a mineral fee. See Discussion Note, 1 Oil and Gas Rep. 960
and cases cited in note 46, infra.
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manner, the grant of a fractional "royalty" interest has been held to
create a mineral fee estate where the deed specifies that the grantee
shall be entitled to ingress and egress to produce and develop the
property and to participate in delay rents and bonuses, or where the
instrument discloses a46 clear intention to convey minerals in place
rather than royalties.

THE "DOUBLE GRANT" DOCTRINE

The concept of double grants or "two-grants-in-one" has been
the source of considerable confusion, and in some instances moderate chaos, in the construction of mineral and royalty instruments in
Texas. First propounded in Hoffman v. Magnolia Petroleum Co.,41

its application has almost unerringly failed to effectuate the probable intention of the parties. The concept arises in connection with
the use of mineral deed forms containing granting, "subject-to,"
participation and reversionary clauses, all of which provide blanks
for the insertion of fractions.48 Compound the numerous blank
spaces in the deed form with the average layman's misconception of
the landowner's interest in the minerals, add the frenzied dealing in
the heat of a new oil discovery, and the result is at best puzling.
Considering the prevalence of and addiction to the printed form
mineral deed, the situation is not likely to improve. On the almost
invariably valid assumption that both parties intend the grantee
to participate in rentals and royalties under all leases, whether
existing or future, in the same proportion, and contemplate the
same undivided ownership in the minerals both before and after
the termination of an existing lease, the deed form mentioned
should be completed by the insertion of the same fractional interest
in all of the blanks. Unfortunately, however, the cases disclose an
almost irresistible impulse to insert one fraction in the granting and
reversionary clauses and a fraction eight times as large in the
"subject-to" and "participation" clauses. Tipps v. Bodine49 and several other decisions,5o exemplify the dilemma posed by the misuse
of fractions in these forms.
The "double grant" theory in essence holds that an instrument
may convey one interest in the mineral fee estate both before and
after termination of the existing lease, and a completely different
46 Loeffler v. King, 149 Tex. 626, 236 S.W.2d 772 (1951), reversing, 228 S.W.2d 201 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1950); McLain v. First Nat'l Bank, 264 S.W.2d 1192 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954); Crumpton v. Scott, 250
S.W.2d 953 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952) (granting clause: /3 undivided interest in "our royalty rights"; intention clause: "intended to convey . . . a 1/3 undivided interest in and to all mineral rights"); Acklin v.
Fuqua, 193 S.W.2d 297 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946).
4i273 S.W. 828 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925).
4s The granting clause conveying an undivided interest in the minerals, the "subiect-to" clause
reciting an existing lease and providing for the sharing of rents and royalties thereunder, the "participation clause" governing division of rents and royalties under future leases, and the "reversionary" clause prescribing the ownership in the mineral estate upon termination of the existing lease.
49 101 S.W.2d 1075 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937). Amazingly enough the court observed that no language
"would more clearly and accurately express the intention of the parties" in construing a deed conveying a 1/16 mineral fee interest and providing for participation in 1/2 the royalty and rental under
an existing lease, but reciting that the grantee should own 1/16 of the minerals on termination of the
existing lease. The deed was held to convey a 1/2 mineral interest.
GoRichardson v. Hart, 143 Tex. 392, 185 S.W.2d 563 (1945), modifying, 183 S.W.2d 235 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1944); Dils Co. v. Garrett, 294 S.W.2d 730 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956) (writ of error granted
and case presently pending in the Supreme Court of Texas); Williams v. J. & C. Royalty Co., 254
S.W.2d 178 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952); Acklin v. Fuqua, 193 S.W.2d 297 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946) (mentioning, but apparently not applying, the "double-grant" theory); Schubert v. Miller, 119 S.W.2d (Tex. Civ.
App. 1938).
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interest in the rentals and royalties to accrue under such lease. As
a result of the application of this doctrine, it is not unusual for a
court to hold that a grantee shall receive 1/8 of the rental and royalty
under an existing lease and 1/64 of these payments under future
leases. The fact that the reduced participation under future leases
is nearly always Vs of the interest under the existing lease lends
credence to the supposition that although it might be legally possible to make a double grant in the same instrument, the possibility
of the parties so intending is exteremely remote. Instruments of
this type appear to be patently amibiguous (notwithstanding the
courts' repeated assertions that they are not), requiring the admission of extrinsic evidence in explanation of intention. 51
MISCELLANEOUS TEXAS DECISIONS

Although too numerous, or not of sufficient general importance,
to examine in detail and too divergent to categorize, there are sev-2
eral other Texas cases deserving of mention. Allen v. Creighton5
holds that an inconsistency between the granting and a later clause
in a royalty deed will be construed in favor of the grantee. Howell
v. Liles 53 mentions the apparent inconsistency, if not repugnancy,
between the phrase "royalty mineral rights" and the words "total
mineral rights," both contained in the same deed.5 4 Peacock v. Alexander 5 and Commerce Trust Co. v. Lyon"t are both decisions limiting a retained royalty interest to an existing lease. Caraway v.
Owens" illustrates that it is not necessary to reserve or convey
royalty in terms of " /," holding the reservation of "a fee royalty of
1/32 of the oil and gas" as entitling the grantor to 1/32 of the gross
production. Another recent decision points up the necessity for
careful draftsmanship, holding that the owner of a reserved Y2 of Y8
of the oil, gas and other mineral royalty is entitled to receive, under
a standard Y8 lease, only 1/128 of the gross production.5
RELATED PROBLEMS
While not precisely relevant to the present inquiry concerning
the distinction between mineral and royalty interests, the conveys, See Craft v. Hahn, 246 S.W.2d 897 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952), where the plaintiff wisely alleged
mutual mistake thus permitting introduction of parol testimony regarding the expressed understanding
of the parties. Such an alternative allegation should always be considered in the "inconsistent fraction" cases.
' 131 S.W.2d 47 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939).
3S246 S.W.2d 260 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951).
s'The case is principally of interest, however, because it involves the doctrine of Duhig v.
Peavy-Moore Lumber Co., 135 Tex. 503, 144 S.W.2d 878 (1943), which was followed (without citation) in Brown v. Kirk, 127 Colo. 453, 257 P.2d 145 (1953), under which a reservatoin of minerals in
a warranty deed was held inclusive of all previously reserved or conveyed mineral interests. First
announced in Klein v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 126 Tex. 450, 86 S.W.2d 1077 (1935), the principle
has been followed, explained and modified in Benge v. Schaurbauer, 152 Tex. 447, 259 S.W.2d 166
1953), modifying, 254 S.W.2d 236 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952); Sharp v. Fowler, 151 Tex. 490, 252 S.W.2d
153 (1952); Winters v. Slaver, 151 Tex. 485, 251 S.W.2d 726 1952); Pich v. Lankford, 295 S.W.2d 749
(Tex. Civ. App. 1956) (writ of error granted and presently pending in the Supreme Court of Texas);
Harris v. Windsor, 279 S.W.2d 648 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955); McLain v. First Nat'l Bank, 263 S.W.2d
324 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953); Howell v. Liles, 246 S.W.2d 260 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951); Coffee v. Manley,
166 S.W.2d 377 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942).
5 250 S.W.2d 953 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952).
56 284 S.W.2d 290 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955).
254 S.W.2d 425 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955). But see Remuda Oil Co. v. Wilson, 264 S.W.2d 192 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1954).
5' Harris v. Ritter, 154 Tex. 474, 279 S.W.2d 845 (1955), modifying, 267 S.W.2d 247 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1954).
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ancer, regardless of his jurisdiction, should be aware of the various
Texas decisions dealing with the problem of transfer of mineral
and royalty interests by a grantor owning less than the full interest.5 9 One final problem, apparently thus far peculiar to Texas,
should also be mentioned. Dicta in two earlier cases indicating that
is
any royalty reserved in an oil and gas lease in excess of 1/8
"bonus"60 gave rise to the decision in Griffith v. Taylor "' in the
Texas Court of Civil Appeals in Amarillo. The court construed a
interest in the minerals in
conveyance granting an undivided
of all of the /8 oil royalty
place, but providing that it included
under any existing or future lease, as prohibiting the grantee from
participating in royalty reserved under a later lease (the grantor
The
having retained the exclusive leasing power) in excess of 1/8.
Supreme Court of Texas reversed, holding that the 1/16 royalty
was "royalty"
reserved in the lease over and above the standard 1/8
in the normal and ordinary sense, and the grantee of an undivided
mineral interest was entitled to share therein. 2 The case seems
to establish that any payment to a lessor, whether in money or in
kind, of a fractional interest in the production under an oil and gas
lease constitutes "royalty," at least where the interest is not terminable after the receipt of a specified sum.6 3 There is still a possibility

under the decision in State Nat'l Bank6 4 that a so-called "production
payment" which terminates upon receipt of a certain sum of money
out of oil would not constitute "royalty." An interesting case would
be presented if the amount to be satisfied out of the production payment were so great as to render the interest perpetual for all practical purposes. For example, to cite a ludicrous extreme, a production payment of one billion dollars payable out of 1/16 of the oil and
gas produced, saved and marketed from a forty-acre tract.
(To be concluded in a later issue of DICTA)
W E.g.,Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Harrison, 146 Tex. 216, 205 S.W.2d 355 (1947); King v. First
Nat'l Bank, 144 Tex. 583, 192 S.W.2d 260 (1946); Minchen v. Hirsch, 295 S.W.2d 529 (Tex. Civ. App.
1956); McElnurroy v. McElmurray, 270 S.W.2d 880 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955); Dowda v. Hayman, 221
S.W.2d 1016 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949); Hooks v. Neill, 21 S.W.2d 532 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929); Note 25
Texas L. Rev. 100 (1946). And see Masterson, supra note 16, at 254.
0 State Nat'l Bank v. Morgan, 135 Tex. 509, 143 S.W.2d 757 (1940); Sheppard v. Stanolind Oil
& Gas Co., 125 S.W.2d 643 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939).
m 284 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955).
- Griffith v. Taylor, 291 S.W.2d 673 (Tex. 1956). And see Morris v. First Nat'lBank, 249 S.W.2d
269 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952).
03See McMahon v. Christmann, 285 S.W.2d 818 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955).
04 State Nat'lBank v. Morgan, 135 Tex. 509, 143 S.W.2d 757 (1940).
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